Introduction

Ambassador K. P. Fabian is one of India’s most seasoned diplomats, a veteran of the Indian Foreign Service (1964–2000) whose career spanned critical postings in Iran, Sri Lanka, Canada, Austria, Finland, Qatar, and Italy, as well as multilateral representation at the UN agencies in Vienna, Montréal, and Rome.

He witnessed historic events from close quarters—including the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1990–91 Gulf War, during which, as Joint Secretary (Gulf Division), he coordinated the safe evacuation of over 176,000 Indian nationals from Iraq and Kuwait—the largest civilian airlift in history.

As India’s Ambassador to Finland, Qatar, and Italy, he worked at the heart of diplomacy in regions where energy, security, and international negotiations intersect. His global exposure across the Middle East, Europe, and multilateral institutions gives him a unique perspective on shifting power dynamics.

A prolific writer and thinker, Ambassador Fabian has authored Commonsense on the War on Iraq, Diplomacy: Indian Style, and The Arab Spring That Was and Wasn’t, while continuing to teach, advise, and write extensively on international affairs. He is currently writing a book on Palestine and Israel.

His blend of practical experience and scholarly depth makes his voice especially valuable in analyzing the Ukraine conflict, great power realignments, and their business–economic consequences for India and the Global South.

Interview Questions

I. Setting the Context

1. Your Excellency, you’ve witnessed global diplomacy at turning points. How do you interpret the Ukraine conflict today—is it still about Ukraine, or has it become a struggle over the global order itself?
The Ukraine conflict occurred primarily because Ukraine sought NATO membership. Russia concluded that if Ukraine became a member, American missiles would be deployed too close to Russia. A historical parallel is the Cuban Missile Crisis when John Kennedy demanded that Nikita Khrushchev remove nuclear missiles from Cuba.

The conflict has been aggravated by European NATO members supporting Ukraine militarily, even after the U.S. under Trump withdrew support. Europeans have demonized Putin, while Zelensky refuses to recognize the futility of fighting an unwinnable war.

Regarding the global order, tension could persist between Russia and some European powers. If not managed wisely, it risks wider war—though, to my mind, the probability remains low.

2. Do you see this war as a turning point toward multipolarity, or essentially a prolonged US–Russia confrontation with other powers adjusting their stance?
It has ceased to be a U.S.–Russia confrontation after Trump became President in January 2025.
Multipolarity is advancing for reasons beyond the Ukraine conflict. One main driver is Trump’s policies.

II. Global Power Realignments

3. Russia and China appear to be deepening their strategic partnership. Where does India fit in this evolving equation, given its historic ties with Moscow and its complex engagement with Beijing?
Russia and China have already formed an axis against U.S. hegemony. This has existed for years, though Western governments and analysts were slow to recognize it.

Multipolarity is not new—Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin called for it as early as 1997. The context today, however, is transformed: Russia is stronger, China’s GDP is now 60% of America’s (compared to 3.5% in 1997), and U.S.–European relations are strained under Trump.

India has long sought a multipolar world. Though it moved closer to the U.S. recently, Trump’s tariffs have forced New Delhi to rethink. India will not fully embrace RIC (Russia–India–China), but it will deepen ties with both Russia and China while maintaining strategic autonomy.

4. Many analysts call India the “swing state” in this conflict. Do you agree?
No, India is not a “swing state.”

5. Washington is recalibrating—tough on Moscow but selectively engaging Beijing. How sustainable is this approach?
We may see Trump pursuing a tripolar order with America, China, and Russia dominating separate regions, leaving the Global South largely outside.

6. Is the West’s unity on Ukraine fragile?
The West’s unity is already fractured. Trump has stopped sending arms to Ukraine, preferring instead to sell weapons to NATO allies. Macron and Starmer’s push for direct troop involvement faces political backlash. Despite sanctions and aid, Russia retains local military advantages.

7. How do you view India’s strategic partnership with the U.S. amid neutrality?
Trump ordered India to stop buying Russian oil. India refused. A Trump–Modi meeting may soon address tariffs, but India’s stance of strategic independence remains firm.

III. India’s Strategic Dilemmas

8. How credible is India’s call for diplomacy and dialogue?
Eventually, after exhausting other options, the world will realize India is right.

9. Risks and benefits of India’s balancing act?
India must resolve tariff issues with the U.S., but discounted Russian energy remains beneficial.

10. Critics argue India is funding Russia’s war by importing cheap oil. Your response?
Invalid criticism—Western nations continue importing energy and materials from Russia themselves. India acts according to market realities.

11. Can India sustain its balancing act?
Yes. Moscow respects India’s autonomy. Washington expects alignment, but India has made clear it won’t fully align.

12. Should India mediate in Ukraine peace talks?
No. Mediation is unnecessary beyond Trump’s role. Since Zelensky demanded India stop importing Russian oil, New Delhi should not waste time.

13. How can India ensure it isn’t sidelined in future negotiations?
By not over-investing effort—India should focus elsewhere.

IV. Business & Economic Impacts

14. How sustainable is India’s reliance on Russian crude?
There is no “reliance.” Purchases depend on market conditions.

15. How will the conflict reshape LNG and gas trade for Gulf partners?
India will continue long-term energy ties with Qatar and the Gulf while adjusting to global shifts.

16. What vulnerabilities in wheat, fertilizer, and minerals?
Disruptions exist, but global markets are gradually adjusting.

17. Could India become a supply-chain hub?
No. India lacks resources but is exploring ways to reduce harm.

18. Is de-dollarisation gaining momentum?
Yes, but India should not lead—it risks U.S. retaliation. Instead, India promotes national currency trade.

19. Will local currency trade agreements last?
Yes, they are likely to become permanent.

V. Global South & Investment Shifts

20. How has the conflict altered investment flows?
Not directly. OECD investors are slowly recognizing Africa and Asia’s potential.

21. Is the Global South emerging as a growth driver?
Yes. BRICS already contribute more to global GDP (PPP terms) than the G7.

22. Which sectors benefit most from geopolitical realignments?
Defence production, green energy, AI, digital finance, and the blue economy.

VI. Looking Ahead

23. Does the conflict accelerate the decline of dollar dominance?
No, not directly.

24. How might it reshape Asian security?
The conflict does not significantly alter Gulf, Central, or South Asian security dynamics.

25. Roadmap for ending the war—what role for India/Global South?
Hardly any meaningful role.

26. Message for young Indians and Afro-Asian entrepreneurs?
Understand geopolitics before investing. Globalization is reversing. Africa is integrating and offers bright opportunities, while Asia’s integration is slower but progressing in ASEAN, GCC, and BIMSTEC regions.