Divergent Trajectories of Democratic Change and Authoritarian Continuity
The year 2025 emerged as a revealing moment in Africa’s political landscape. Across the continent, elections exposed sharp contrasts, between democratic consolidation and deepening authoritarianism; between peaceful alternation of leaders and militarised seizure of state institutions. While some states demonstrated resilience in electoral governance, others underscored structural fragility that continues to limit democratic expansion. Taken together, the electoral outcomes of 2025 showed how Africa’s democratisation remains uneven, shaped by domestic political bargains, institutional maturity, and elite incentives.
Democratic Consolidation: Seychelles and Malawi as Positive Outliers
Two elections, Seychelles and Malawi, stood out as clear markers of democratic progress. In Seychelles, general elections held between 27 September and 9–11 October 2025 produced a peaceful, credible leadership transition. Opposition leader Patrick Herminie won with around 53 per cent, and the incumbent voluntarily accepted defeat. Election observers from the AU, SADC, and COMESA reported the process as free and fair. This peaceful alternation of power reinforced an emerging tradition where incumbents leave office without institutional contestation. As a small island nation with strong civil service capacity and manageable political contestation, Seychelles demonstrated that norms of democratic maturity can be institutionalised and routinised.
Malawi provided an even stronger example given its turbulent political experience over previous decades. The 16 September 2025 general elections led to the return of former president Peter Mutharika, who defeated the incumbent Lazarus Chakwera in a high-turnout poll of approximately 76 per cent. That a sitting president peacefully transferred power reaffirmed Malawi’s status as a rare African democracy where courts remain independent and multiparty competition is genuine. These developments follow Malawi’s landmark judicial annulment of election results in 2020, a decision that demonstrated institutional autonomy. The 2025 outcome shows continuity in democratic practice, illustrating that credible opposition victories remain possible even in contexts of economic hardship.
Together, Seychelles and Malawi challenge the assumption that African democracy is weakening everywhere. They show that institutional design, political restraint, and elite acceptance of electoral uncertainty can deliver meaningful democratic consolidation.
Authoritarian Reinforcement Through Managed Elections
A contrasting pattern emerged in states where elections were held without real competition. Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Comoros, and Togo exemplified systems where electoral processes served to ratify the continuation of incumbent power.
In Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 elections, President Samia Suluhu Hassan claimed victory with an overwhelming 97.66 per cent. Such margins reflected not popular consensus but structural dominance of the ruling party. Opposition parties faced systematic suppression, including harassment of candidates, arrests, and restricted campaigning. Reports of violence and temporary internet shutdowns further undermined transparency. The outcome indicated the consolidation of one-party dominance, reaffirming Tanzania’s long-standing pattern where electoral competition exists only symbolically.
Côte d’Ivoire’s election on 25 October 2025 returned President Alassane Ouattara to office with about 91 per cent of votes. However, the result was shaped by legal and constitutional manipulation. Opposition candidates were disqualified or discouraged through institutional barriers. Rather than resorting to coercion, the regime used bureaucratic and judicial means to engineer an uncontested election. This outcome reflected authoritarian entrenchment achieved through legal design rather than repression in the streets.
In Burundi’s 5 June parliamentary elections, the ruling CNDD-FDD won virtually all seats, aided by restrictions and harassment of opposition groups. Elections existed in form rather than substance. Political competition remained virtually absent.
Similarly, in Comoros, parliamentary elections on 12 January 2025 gave the ruling CRC 31 of 33 seats, with limited opposition participation. This outcome reinforced executive supremacy, with weak institutional checks.
Togo’s 15 February 2025 Senate elections consolidated the ruling UNIR party’s dominance, winning 34 of 41 seats. More crucial, however, was the constitutional reform that strengthened long-term rule by the Gnassingbé family, already in power for over five decades. Now the President is indirectly elected by the Parliament. Togo demonstrated one of the most sophisticated forms of authoritarian persistence, not through violence, but through legal restructuring that transforms leadership continuity into a quasi-hereditary framework.
Across these countries, elections functioned not to enable change, but to institutionalise continuity. They reinforce the modern authoritarian trend where incumbents rely less on open coercion and more on control of institutions, legal barriers, and electoral rules.
The failures of democratic governance were most visible in Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, and Gabon.
Guinea-Bissau: Collapse of Electoral Order
In the 23 November 2025 Guinea-Bissau presidential election, ballots were seized by armed groups, and results could not be declared. The military intervened, staging a coup, and a junta assumed control. Unlike other coup-prone states, where leaders attempt civilianisation through elections, Guinea-Bissau’s political order collapsed entirely. The episode reflected systemic fragmentation of state authority, widespread elite competition, and the absence of institutional stabilisers. The AU suspended Guinea-Bissau due to the coup.
Cameroon’s 12 October 2025 election once again returned Paul Biya, in power since 1982, with roughly 53 per cent of the vote. The election was overshadowed by repression, suppression of protests, arrests of dissenters, and deepening crisis in Anglophone regions. The death of an opposition figure while in custody reinforced perceptions of impunity. Cameroon illustrates democratic stagnation: institutions exist, but they are subordinated to executive authority.
Gabon’s 12 April 2025 presidential election confirmed transitional military leader Brice Oligui Nguema with approximately 95 per cent of votes. The election occurred after the 2023 military takeover, and despite formal civilianisation, the military remained the core power broker. Thus, elections functioned instrumentally to legitimise military rule rather than create competitive choice.
What 2025 Tells Us About Africa’s Democratic Landscape
The 2025 electoral cycle reinforced several larger conclusions.
First, political pluralism has survived but remains unevenly distributed. A small cluster of states—Malawi, Seychelles, Ghana, Cape Verde, and Botswana—continue to sustain electoral accountability.
Second, legal and constitutional engineering has become the modern instrument of authoritarian rule. Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, and Togo exemplify calibrated strategies that minimise confrontation while guaranteeing incumbency.
Third, militarisation remains a major risk, particularly in states with fragmented authority or weak formal institutions.
Fourth, regional organisations responded unevenly. While AU and SADC validated credible elections, they were far more cautious in condemning flawed ones, reflecting declining continental consensus on democratic norms.
Finally, the elections showed that democracy in Africa is neither collapsing universally nor consolidating uniformly. Instead, the continent is witnessing differentiated pathways: some countries deepening democratic norms, others institutionalising authoritarian resilience, and still others collapsing into elite-driven instability.
The lesson of 2025 is that elections remain central to political legitimacy across Africa, but their function varies widely. Where elite incentives align with democratic outcomes and institutions retain autonomy, elections deliver peaceful alternation. Where elites view power as dynastic entitlement or economic resource, elections are re-engineered to preserve dominance. The coming years will reveal whether the positive models demonstrated in Seychelles and Malawi can spread, or whether authoritarian consolidation becomes the dominant regional trend.
In 2026 elections are scheduled in Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali and Tunisia with most seen as authoritarian regimes. Democratic change has its work cut out in 2026.
The African Union and Election Monitoring
In 2025, the African Union’s (AU) election monitoring stands at a critical crossroads. Growing concerns over legitimacy and mixed responses to disputed elections reflect a widening gap between normative commitments and actual enforcement. Analysts argue that the AU now needs to do two things: avoid unconstitutional changes of government, and do so by fostering “a true democratic culture in African states,” setting “clear rules on matters such as constitutional changes that are often manipulated by incumbents to stay in power,” and crucially, enforcing these rules “without fear or favour.” Yet the AU’s performance throughout 2025 illustrates how difficult this balance remains.
The contradiction between principle and practice was evident in Tanzania. The AU Commission’s Chairperson congratulated President Samia Suluhu after she reportedly won with 97.66% of the vote, a margin that raised immediate concerns. Just days later, the AU’s own election observation mission stated that the elections “did not comply with AU principles, normative frameworks, and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections.” The dissonance between political messaging and on-ground assessments undermined credibility and raised questions about autonomy, political influence, and institutional coherence.
Nevertheless, 2025 also marked attempts to strengthen internal mechanisms. The Pan-African Parliament, working with DPAPS through the Democracy and Elections Unit and with technical support from EISA, convened a major election observation training programme in Pretoria in November 2025. Bringing together more than 40 parliamentarians, the programme aimed to “strengthen their capacity to participate effectively” in AU Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs). This effort recognises that meaningful oversight requires trained actors rather than symbolic delegations.
The structure of AU missions already reflects continental diversity: ambassadors in Addis Ababa, parliamentarians, civil society representatives, EMB officials and electoral experts from member states typically take part. Yet critics note that without enforcement powers, such missions risk becoming procedural exercises.
Ultimately, 2025 reaffirmed that observing elections is not enough. The AU must reinforce post-election accountability, apply its rules consistently, and resist congratulatory diplomacy when democratic standards are breached. Only then can election monitoring evolve from ritualistic reporting into genuine democratic guardianship.
